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THE "HOBBY LOSSES" SECTION OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE - AN UNCON-
STITUTIONAL INCOME TAX STATUTE?
You tax me for a wizard-you may as well tax
me for a buzzard: I have done no harm.
- A defendant. Salem, 1692.
At a time when Congress and the Treasury are comprehen-
sively reviewing the Internal Revenue Code with a view to
providing a more rational tax system, it is to be hoped that
Section 130 1 - the so-called "hobby losses" section of the
Code - will be scrapped.2 For the additional tax imposed by
Section 130 is a foolish tax - so foolish, indeed, as to raise
a serious question as to its constitutionality.
1 58 STAT. 48, 26 U.S.C. § 130 (1944) (INT. REv. CODE § 130): "(a) Recompu-
tation of Net Income. - If the deductions (other than taxes and interest) allow-
able to an individual (except for the provisions of this section) and attributable to
a trade or business carried on by him for five consecutive taxable years have, in each
of such years, exceeded by more than $50,000 the gross income derived from such
trade or business, the net income of such individual for each of such years shall be
recomputed. For the purpose of such recomputation in the case of any such taxable
year, such deductions shall be allowed only to the extent of $50,000 plus the gross
income attributable to such trade or business, except that the net operating loss
deduction, to the extent attributable to such trade or business, shall not be allowed."
See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.130-1 (a) (2) (1953): "If an individual carries
on several trades or businesses, the deductions attributable to such trades or busi-
nesses, and the gross income derived from such trades or businesses, shall not be
aggregated in determining whether the deductions (other than those for interest and
taxes) exceed the gross income derived from such trades or businesses by more than
$50,000 in any taxable year. Each trade or business shall be considered separately.
The trade or business carried on by the individual must be the same in each of the
five consecutive taxable years in which the deductions (other than those for interest
and taxes) exceed the gross income derived from such trade or business by more
than $50,000."
2 The Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, which
overhauled many sections of the Internal Revenue Code, does not recommend out-
right repeal of § 130. Rather, the Committee has recommended that for purposes of
§ 130 the following deductions (in addition to those for interest and taxes) will not
be taken into account: casualty losses, farming losses and expenses which are
directly attributable to drought, and expenditures with respect to which the tax-
payer is given an option either to deduct as expenses when incurred or to defer or
capitalize. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 270 (1954). See H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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Section 130 limits the extent to which wealthy taxpayers
can take deductions against other income for business enter-
prises which they operate either as individuals or as partners.3
It provides that where, for five consecutive years, an in-
dividual's allowable deductions (exclusive of interest and
taxes) in respect of a trade or business are more than $50,000
in excess of the business' gross income, then the taxpayer's
income tax for the five years must be recomputed by reducing
to $50,000 for each year the amount whereby these deduc-
tions have exceeded gross income. In the recomputation, no
net operating loss deduction is allowed.
At the time of its enactment in 1944, Section 130 was
popularily known as "the Marshall Field bill": 4 It was be-
lieved that Mr. Field was operating his liberal newspapers
PM and the Chicago Sun as a sole proprietorship, and that,
since they were both thought to be losing money at that
time, the Government was, in a sense, "financing" these publi-
cations in part out of taxes that Mr. Field otherwise would
presumably have had to pay. Senator Clark of Missouri, a
member of the Senate Finance Committee, stated, in effect,
that it was only on the basis that the proposed amendment
would have some adverse effect on Mr. Field's publishing
operations that the amendment was carried in the Com-
mittee.5
3 Rev. Rul. 155, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17 at 6 (1953): ... it is held that
Section 130 is applicable to a trade or business carried on in the form of a partnership
by individuals. However, as Section 130 is applicable only if an individual's loss
from a trade or business carried on by him is in excess of $50,000, it is further held
that such section should be applied to a business of an individual operated in part-
nership form only where the individual partner's distributive share of a partnership
loss is in excess of $50,000, exclusive of interest and taxes."
See also Rev. Rul. 221, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21 at 13 (1953), which holds:
. . that where a particular business of an individual is conducted in one or more
forms such as a partnership, joint venture, or individual proprietorship, the in-
dividual's share of the profits and losses from each business unit must be aggregated
to determine the applicability of Section 130 of the Code."
4 "Senate puts 'Field Amendment' in Tax Bill, Cutting Loss-Taking." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 1944, § 1, p. 1, col. 2. See also 90 CONG. Rac. 226 (1944).
5 90 CONG. Rxc. 223-24 (1944). The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 37 to
26, with 27 Republicans in the majority, and two voting against. The same bill (but
with a $10,000 annual limit) had been defeated in the Senate Finance Committee by
HOBBY LOSSES - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 415
Senator Danaher (R. Conn.), sponsor of the bill, disavow-
ed any purpose to reach Mr. Field specifically, but, rather,
put his argument on the grounds that the bill was designed
to prevent wealthy taxpayers from indulging their hobbies
"at the expense of other taxpayers." He referred to decisions6
in which the courts had found that activities of the rich in
such enterprises as horse racing, farming, and polo pony
breeding constituted trades or businesses, thereby entitling
the taxpayers to deduct business expenses and other business
deductions against other income. Senator Danaher was frank
to say that his bill was intended to set up a presumption
(necessarily conclusive) that persons whose annual operating
losses from a particular trade or business exceeded $50,000
for five successive years were indulging a hobby.
Senator Barkley (D. Ky.) led the attack on the bill. He
and his supporters appear to have been principally concerned
over the effect that the proposed law would have on breeders
of thoroughbred cattle and horses. Their argument was that
the improvement of the breed normally involves sfibstantial
continuing expenditures over a period of years before the
strain produces.7 In many cases, evidently, breeding is under-
taken as an individual operation by persons financially able
to nurse the venture through its first unprofitable years; these
persons have to rely upon other sources of income to cover
expenses of their breeding operations. These enterprises are
one vote in 1942. 88 CONG. REC. 8034 (1942). Senator Danaher had thereupon intro-
duced it from the floor, where it passed the Senate, only to be discarded in confer-
ence. H.R. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1942).
6 Senator Danaher mentioned by name George D. Widener, 8 B.T.A. 651
(1927), aff'd, 33 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1929) (racing stable); and Plant v. Walsh, 280
Fed. 722 (D. Conn. 1922) (farm). 90 CoNG. REC. 224, 226 (1944). He also mentioned
an unreported 1932 case involving Marshall Field's racing stables, which covered
years subsequent to those in issue in Commissioner v. Field, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1933), where the business nature of Mr. Field's racing stables was upheld. In intro-
ducing the same bill in 1942, Senator Danaher also cited Whitney v. Commissioner,
73 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1934) (racing stable); and Farish v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 63
(5th Cir. 1939) (racing stable and polo pony breeding). 88 CoNG. REc. 8035 (1942).
7 Cf. James M. McDonald, 17 T.C. 210, 212 (1951), where the court found
that not until bulls are five years old can their worth as sires be established; and
that cows can be as old as eight before the quality of their calves can be known.
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in most cases bona fide business ventures. Therefore, the bill
would reach many persons who were not engaged in practices
which the bill was designed to curb. Senator Barkley esti-
mated that "hundreds of thousands" of such taxpayers would
be affected by the bill (which contained a yearly figure of
$20,000, instead of the present $50,000).8 And, although this
estimate was doubtless high, nevertheless it is interesting to
note that the first case that Section 130 has spawned involved
the breeder of one of the best herds of Guernsey cattle in the
United States.'
Because Section 130 is directed against the wealthy, no
popular clamor for its repeal can be expected. Yet, in the
belief that the rich are entitled to as rational a system of
taxation as others, it is here proposed to point out some of the
questionable features of Section 130 and to suggest doubt as
to its constitutionality.
I.
The basic absurdity of Section 130 is that it imposes an
additional tax because a man has lost money - more than
$50,000 of it for each of five successive years - in the bona
fide pursuit of profit."0 His business can be any kind - manu-
facturing, oil, newspapers, hotels - indistinguishable in char-
acter from those generally carried on in corporate form. And
8 90 CONO. REc. 227 (1944). The amount was $20,000 in the original bill which
passed the Senate; it was raised to $50,000 in conference. H.R. REP. No. 1079, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1944).
9 James M. McDonald, 17 T.C. 210 (1951). The only other § 130 case that has
reached the courts is Fred MacMurray, 21 T.C. No. 2, P-H 1953 T.C. REP. DEc.
21.2 (1953), where the Government unsuccessfully sought to apply § 130 to a hus-
band and wife who owned as community property, ranch properties which had
incurred losses of from $61,000 to $128,000 annually over a five-year period.
10 Technically an additional tax is not imposed but the tax in respect of each of
the five years is increased by limiting the deduction. Incidentally, it could be argued
from a literal reading of §§ 130 (b), 130 (c), 292 (a) and 56 (a) that the taxpayer
would have to pay interest on each of these deficiences computed from the time when
the tax to which it relates was initially due. However, this result is so incongruous
and so contrary to the basic concept of interest that it is doubtful that it would ever
seriously be urged, or, if urged, accepted.
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it can be the kind of business, hotels for example, 1 which may
be a losing proposition in hard times, and which can be a
bonanza in good; or it can be the kind of business, stock
breeding for example, 2 which by its very nature cannot
normally be expected to produce profits for the first five
years.
Actually, of course, the principal effect of Section 130 on
those whom it might reach is simply to limit their freedom of
action to conduct such businesses as they wish in their
individual capacity, or as partners. Thus, when a taxpayer
is threatened by this section and is forewarned," he will
normally seek to avoid it by following one of three courses of
action: (1) he can reduce his fifth-year operating loss to less
than $50,000 by such means as are open to him;' 4 (2) he
can incorporate; or (3) he can sell his business. The effect
is that the taxpayer must take a course of action which he
believes to be uneconomical; and, if he is correct in his esti-
mate of his own best interests, then it is the Treasury that is
the loser in the end. For this reason it is problematic whether
Section 130 is producing any additional revenue at all; and
it is not surprising that at the time of its enactment the
11 "The depression . . . bankrupted probably 85 per cent of United States
hotels. .. ." Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 2, 1954, p. 39, col. 2.
12 Cf. James M. McDonald, 17 T.C. 210 (1951), and Farish v. Commissioner,
103 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1939), where it was shown that the breeding, development
and training of polo ponies requires about eight years before they are salable.
13 Presumably no taxpayer would expose himself to § 130 if he could avoid it.
Yet it is certain that there will be taxpayers who fail to do so because they are
uninformed or have been misadvised. The numerous cases under the personal hold-
ing company tax (e.g., those cited in note 69 infra) bear witness to the fact that
the wealthy do not always retain lawyers or accountants, or that when they do, the
advisers are not always alert to the traps that their clients might have avoided in the
Code. So, too, in the case of a taxpayer who must pay the tax under § 130, the
Treasury is enriched because he did not hire an alert lawyer or accountant. The
application of the tax, then, has a strong element of unfairness and unjust enrich-
ment in the sense that the Government is collecting a tax which it would not have
received had the taxpayer been aware of its existence. These considerations suggest
the desirability of making any repeal of § 130 retroactive.
14 The owner of a racing stable, for example, may be in a position to sell off
some horses at a profit. Cf. Commissioner v. Field, 67 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1933),
where it was shown that the taxpayer could have made a profit for the year in
question by selling his brood mares, but to the ultimate detriment of his stables.
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Treasury could make no estimate of the additional revenue,
if any, that Section 130 might produce.15
If there were some important tax abuse that was being
dealt with by Section 130, its consequences might be justified.
It is submitted, however, that a review of the cases in the
area"8 which most concerned the proponents of the bill does
not disclose any pattern of judicial error in applying the con-
cepts underlying business deductions. Some cases there are
where the reader might disagree with the decision, 7 but it is
fair to state that the whole of the decisions in this area does
not create a tax loophole of any sort.
Assuming that these decisions were wrong, they were wrong
because the kind of enterprise involved, racing stables for
example, as well as the extent of the losses, stamped it as a
personal, and not a business, operation. If this, then, was the
loophole which Congress wished to close, the statute should
have set up a classification in terms of the kind of business
as well as the extent and duration of the losses.
Moreover, is there not something basically fallacious about
the notion that a taxpayer who deducts business operating
losses from other income is conducting his business "at Gov-
ernment expense" or "at the expense of other taxpayers"?
15 90 CONG. REc. 224 (1944). Senator Danaher believed that Section 130 would
produce "millions in revenue"; and he had in mind six or eight cases whose files had
been supplied to him. Id. at 227. In view of the avenues of avoidance that are open,
e.g., incorporation, this claim seems extravagant. The Treasury took no position on
the bill, but one of its representatives indicated that the Treasury did not want it.
Id. at 227, 232.
16 In addition to the cases mentioned in note 6 supra, see, e.g., Tatt v. Commis-
sioner, 166 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1948) (farm) ; Wilson v. Eisner, 282 Fed. 38 (2d Cir.
1922) (racing stable); DuPont v. United States, 28 F.Supp. 122 (D. Del. 1939)
(farm); Lillie S. Wegeforth, 42 B.T.A. 633 (1940) (horsebreeding). Cf. Breckwoldt
and Lockwood, Gentlemen Farmers, 28 TAXES 603 (1950).
17 E.g., Plant v. Walsh, 280 Fed. 722, 725 (D. Conn. 1922). There the court, in
dictum, expressed the view that ".... farming, when engaged in as a regular occupa-
tion and in accordance with recognized business principles and practises, is [not]
any the less a business within the meaning of the statute, because the person engag-
ing in it is willing to do so without regard to its profitableness, because of the
pleasure derived from it." Judge Learned Hand disputes this statement in Thacher
v. Lowe, 288 Fed. 994, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), and there is no question that it repre-
sents an erroneous view of the law.
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It is submitted that this thought, as the basis for Section 130,
presents more than a mere chicken-and-egg question, but,
instead, an important question of tax policy. For this inverted
reasoning assumes that because the state imposes high taxes,
it may for that reason have an interest in inhibiting lawful
and necessary business adtivities the expenses of which have
the effect of reducing currently taxable income.
What Section 130 does in effect is to set up a conclusive
presumption that, to the extent that a person's losses are
excessive under its limitations, they are not really incurred
for business purposes. However, in one context the extent
and duration of the loss may evidence a non-business intent;
in another it may evidence a business intent; or in a third,
it may prove nothing at all.18 And is it not more properly a
judicial than a legislative function to weigh the probative
effect of this factor in different cases? For, the judicial margin
of error is no greater here than anywhere else where the
courts are called upon to apply black-or-white statutory tests
to particular cases; on the other hand, legislative fiat which
can require giving probative effect to a set of facts that are
not in fact probative, defeats the very purpose of the statute
it was intended to implement.
Section 130 is a Congressional aberration which should be
repealed, and if so the repeal should be retroactive. 9
II.
Is Section 130 so lacking in sense as to be unconstitutional?
This depends upon whether the due process clause of the Fifth
18 For example, the losses might be attributable to economic factors such as a
depression. Cf. DuPont v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 122, 124 (D. Del. 1939): "No
one test has ever been put forward as competely decisive. What appeals to one
judge may not appeal to another. For example, some courts have held that where it
appears that a wealthy individual has, over a period of years, succeeded only in
incurring a succession of heavy losses, sufficient to put the average farmer out of
business, this is evidence that his farming is not a business but merely an expensive
hobby. It is, of course, a matter to be considered, but I am inclined to think that it
is entitled to less weight in the final verdict than some courts have accorded it."
19 See note 13 supra.
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Amendment limits Congress' power to impose an income tax
under the Sixteenth Amendment, 0 and whether Section 130
is "arbitrary and unreasonable."
Due Process and Income Tax Statutes
Two recent surveys of the status of federal taxation and
the due process clause in constitutional law pretty well sum-
marize the prevalent understanding of the relationship be-
tween the judicial and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment in these two fields:
Charles L. B. Lowndes, in discussing "Current Constitu-
tional Problems in Federal Taxation," states that:
2'
The most significant constitutional problem in federal taxa-
tion today is the absence of constitutional problems. The
federal income, estate and gift taxes all encountered an ex-
tremely critical reception at the hands of the courts and
suffered serious constitutional set-backs early in their careers.
Today, however, they function in a constitutional climate as
benevolent as it was formerly hostile. A microscopic analysis of
the present federal tax system may reveal minor irregularities
which might conceivably be magnified into major constitutional
issues. From a practical point of view, however, the chance of
invalidating a federal tax assessment on constitutional grounds
is infinitesimal.
And, in a companion piece, Robert L. Stern summarizes
the Court's current attitude toward "substantive due process"
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as follows:1
2
Although there is no longer any doubt as to how the Court
will decide cases [involving purposeful social and economic
legislation], it cannot be said that the Court has limited the
due process clause to procedural matters and repudiated the
concept of due process as a bar to sufficiently arbitrary or
20 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." Id. AMEND. XVI: "The Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion."
21 4 VAND. L. REV. 469 (1951).
22 The Problems of Yesteryear - Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv.
447,450 (1951).
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irrational substantive legislation-although Mr. Justice Black's
opinion in the Lincoln Union E233 case looks strongly in that
direction. The Court has certainly not so stated in express
terms, and the opinions still continue to examine legislation
under attack to see whether it has a rational basis or is
"substantially related to a legitimate end sought to be attain-
ed." 24 But, as the Court recently declared, "a pronounced shift
of emphasis ...has deprived the words 'unreasonable' and
'arbitrary' of the content" which they formerly held.2 5 The
self-abnegation with which the Court now applies the rational-
ity test may, as a practical matter, make it unnecessary for
the Court to decide whether it must reconsider the basic
doctrine.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that "due process" issues
are seldom raised any more in federal tax cases, 6 and that
in neither of the two cases that Section 130 has so far pro-
duced, was its constitutionality attacked. On the other hand,
where the accepted constitutional principles just outlined
would produce a decision that outrages a court's sense of
23 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949) (footnote added).
24 E.g., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186 (1950).
25 Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949).
26 Two constitutional issues have recently been raised, inconclusively, in tax
litigation. The first is found in the line of cases stemming from Lela Sullenger, 11
T.C. 1076 (1949), aff'd and dism'd, 4 P-H 1950 FED. TAx SERV. 71,055 (1950)
(5th Cir.), where the court held that the Commissioner could not constitutionally
disallow over-ceiling prices (paid during World War II) from being taken into
account in computing cost of goods sold; that is, constitutionally speaking, gross
income means gross receipts less cost of goods sold, and that not until cost of goods
sold was ascertained could the rest of the equation be figured. But in Commissioner
v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952), the court held that Congress had not
intended that such over-ceiling payments should be disregarded, or else it would have
expressly so provided as it did later in § 405 of the Defense Production Act of 1950,
64 STAT. 807 (1950), as amended, 65 STAT. 136 (1951), 50 U.S.C. Arr. § 2105 (Supp.
1952) ; hence no constitutional question was involved in its decision.
The second arose in Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953) where
the court, in an alternative holding, held the ten-year provision of the "Clifford
Regulations," then U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-21(c) (1) (1945), unconstitu-
tional as setting up a conclusive presumption of fact. The regulations treat as the
taxable owner of income from a living trust, any grantor who reserves a reversionary
interest which will, or which may reasonably be expected to take effect in possession
or enjoyment within ten years from the date of the transfer. The court relied princi-
pally on Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) and Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270
U.S. 230 (1926). Cf. Note, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 1532 (1953).
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injustice, it is submitted that the due process clause should
be available to produce the just result. 7
Historically, the Supreme Court has never declared an
income tax statute, passed since the Sixteenth Amendment,
to be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
Fifth because it was "arbitrary and unreasonable." But the
power to declare Congressional enactments unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has been
exercised in three cases2" involving statutes passed under the
general taxing power. 9 In principle, there is no reason for
treating with greater deference a statute passed under the
Sixteenth Amendment than one passed under the general
taxing power.
In two of these three cases,3" as in the line of cases where
various state tax statutes were invalidated under the due
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,3 a dissenting chorus consisting (depending upon their
presence) of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone
was heard. But these dissenters never went so far as to ques-
27 For example, were there no other escape in Foley Securities Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 106 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1939), the due process clause should have been relied
on to produce the right result. See note 42 infra and accompanying text. Cf., gen-
erally, CAHN, A SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
28 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (estate tax provision creating con-
clusive presumption that gifts made within two years of death were made in con-
templation of death) ; Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928) (retroactive gift
tax) ; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (retroactive estate tax). Cf. Blodgett
v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1928); Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 H.Rv.
L. REv. 592 (1935).
29 U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
30 The Heiner and Untermyer cases, supra note 28. In the third, Nichols v.
Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927), Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Sanford and Stone con-
curred in the result only, presumably upon the ground that, as a matter of
construction, Congress had not intended the tax to apply in the situation there
in issue.
31 E.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517 (1933); Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 (1931); Coolidge v. Long,
282 U.S. 582 (1931); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928);
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920).
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tion the Court's power to hold a statute unconstitutional on
the grounds that it was arbitrary and unreasonable;3" rather,
finding a reasonable justification for the tax, they challenged
the propriety of the Court's substituting its judgment for
that of the legislature.
Thus, Justice Stone's dissent in Heiner v. Donnan,33 which
is characteristic of the Holmes-Brandeis-Stone approach to
this question, cites with apparent favor Judge Learned
Hand's concurring opinion in Frew v. Bowers4 to the effect
that the estate tax provision there in issue was "too whimsi-
cal to stand"; and Judge Hand's answer35 to the govern-
ment's argument that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
to federal taxation gains added pertinence:
I quite agree that the Supreme Court has in many cases
implied or said as much .... If the rule is to be taken un-
conditionally, taxpayers may be selected by lot and assessments
may vary with the price of wheat. [But a] tax may be so
"arbitrary and capricious," its "inequality" so "gross and
patent," that it will not stand, and as I can think of no other
pertinent constitutional limitation, but the Fifth Amendment,
it seems to me that the rule is not as stark as the defendant
argues.
To ask whether the Court has power to declare unconstitu-
tional an arbitrary and unreasonable statute provides its own
answer; for the Court's responsibility is to dispense justice,
and the citizen's right to justice carries with it a right to a
rational explanation for the sanction or exaction which the
legislature has sought to impose upon him. This right rests
not alone in the content which the courts have given to the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but also in the funda-
32 Cf. Justice Brandeis dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 289 U.S. 282,
286-87 (1932): "Our function is only to determine the reasonableness of the legis-
lature's belief in the existence of evils and in the effectiveness of the remedy
provided."
See also FRANyxURTER, MR. JUsTIcE Hou2 ms AND THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1938):
... it is subtle business to decide, not whether legislation is wise, but whether
legislators were reasonable in believing it to be wise."
33 285 U.S. 312, 350 (1932). See notes 28, 30, supra and accompanying text.
34 12 F.2d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1926), dismissed, 275 U.S. 578 (1927).
35 Id. at 630.
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mental structure of the Constitution: for the power of taxa-
tion, like all other legislative powers, is a delegated power,
a power delegated by the sovereign people; and it simply does
not make sense to say that the people - the sovereign -
would delegate a power which could be exercised so as to take
away their life, liberty or property without reason."6
However, because of the "variable and relative" concep-
tions of reasonableness,37 there is a line to be drawn between
the irrational (i.e., the arbitrary) statute and the merely
unreasonable statute in the sense that "irrational" suggests
an absence of reason as a faculty of the legislature's collective
mind in enacting the statute, and "unreasonable" suggests a
judgment based upon considerations of practicality. 8 Thus,
the legislature may be deemed to have acted irrationally
where there is no connection between the purpose and appli-
cation of a statute; and it is unjust, and it should be un-
constitutional, to give effect to an irrational application of a
36 U.S. CONST. AMEND. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id., Preamble: "We the People of the United States
... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Cf. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REv. 148 and 365, 390 (1928), discussing Locke's influence on the Found-
ing Fathers: "In detail, the limitations which Locke specifies in his Second Treatise
on Civil Government to legislative power are the following: First, it is not arbitrary
power. Not even the majority which determines the form of the government can
vest its agent with arbitrary power, for the reason that the majority right itself
originates in a delegation by free sovereign individuals who had 'in the state of
nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possessions' of others, or even
over their own. In this caveat against 'arbitrary power,' Locke definitely anticipates
the modern latitudinarian concept of due process of law."
But see 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTITuTIoN 675-708 (1953), contending
that, to the authors of the Constitution, "delegated" in the Tenth Amendment
meant "alienated, absolutely parted with, or vested exclusively"; and that: "The use
of the word 'reserved' . . . implied ... that the whole thing - 'sovereignty' - out
of which the 'reserved powers' of the states were created - i.e., 'reserved' - had,
at the same time, been conveyed to the nation." Crosskey also contends that the
second half of the phrase in the Tenth Amendment, reserving powers "to the states
respectively, or to the people," is merely in opposition to the first and that no
divergent meaning is intended. Id. at 702, 705.
37 GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 59 (1941).
38 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2066 (2d ed. 1936): "RATIONAL
suggests esp. the possession of reason regarded as a faculty of the mind; REASONABLE
implies particularly the exercise of reason, or conformity to reason, esp. from a
practical point of view. .. ."
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statute. On the other hand, a statute for which some reason
exists for applying it may be considered "unreasonable" in
terms of the balance of reasons for and against its enactment;
but it is not "irrational" so long as some reason exists for its
application; and the courts, having found a rational basis for
the statute, should not inquire further into its "reasonable-
ness." 39
So, notwithstanding the deference with which the Supreme
Court has come, within the past fifteen years or more, to treat
legislative judgment," it nevertheless has continued to insist
on logical connections between the purpose and effect of
legislation. For example, in Tot v. United States4 the Court
held unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment a provision of the Federal Firearms Act
which stated in part that the possession of a firearm by a
fugitive was presumptive evidence that such firearm was
acquired through interstate commerce in violation of the Act.
There was simply no rational connection between the fact
to be proved (that defendant was a fugitive) and the fact
presumed (that his firearm had been acquired through inter-
state commerce carried on in violation of the Act).
It seems obvious that statutes should meet the test of
rationality. Yet in at least one case where a court squarely
faced the issue of an arbitrary income tax statute, it refused
to declare it unconstitutional. Foley Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner," involved the application of the personal hold-
ing company tax43 to a deficit corporation. Consistent with
39 See Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HAMv.
L. REv. 1, 47-54 (1951), recommending the same approach to civil liberties legisla-
tion. But see Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Hav. L.
REv. 193, 215 (1952), taking issue with Richardson on this point.
40 Cf. Richardson, supra note 39, at 47, n. 193. See, generally, WooD, DuE PRO-
CESS OF LAw (1951), for a recent survey of the course of due process decisions.
41 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
42 106 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1939); accord, Saxon Trading Corp., 45 B.T.A. 16
(1941). But cf. Pembroke Realty & Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 252
(2d Cir. 1941), note 45 infra.
43 Revenue Act of 1934, § 351, 48 STAT. 680, 791 (1934). Cf. INT. REV. CODE
§§ 5oo-5O8.
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the purpose of the tax to compel personal holding companies
to distribute current earnings (thus increasing the income and
the tax liability of their shareholders)," a deduction for
dividends paid was allowed in computing the tax base. Tax-
payer, which had started the year with an operating deficit,
distributed a major part of its earnings for the year to its
shareholders; quite obviously, this was done to avoid the
surtax.
The court held, however, that the word "dividends" did
not include distributions made while capital was impaired:
to the extent of the corporation's deficit, its earnings were
subject to the surtax. 5 So, assuming both distributed current
earnings, a corporation with an initial deficit was taxed,
whereas a corporation without a deficit would not be taxed;
and the bigger the deficit, the bigger the tax.
The eighth circuit could find no justification for the differ-
ent treatment of deficit corporations;46 and it was aware that
Congress had already acknowledged the defect in the statute
in question by amending the tax to correct it, prospectively."
Nevertheless, the court refused to hold the statute uncon-
stitutional, principally, it appears, because the Fifth Amend-
ment limits Congress' power under the Sixteenth Amendment
"only in rare and special instances," and the court did not
consider this to be "a rare and special instance." 48
44 Foley Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 1939).
45 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, faced with the same
problem, construed "dividends" to include the distribution of current earnings even
where the taxpayer had an operating deficit at the time of distribution. Pembroke
Realty & Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1941): "It is
incredible, in the light of the purpose of the legislation, that a different result was
intended in the case of a corporation whose capital happened to be impaired."
46 Foley Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1939).
47 Id. at 734.
48 Id. at 736-37: "Since the power of Congress to tax is not limited by the Fifth
Amendment (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24; Billings v. United
States, 232 U.S. 261, 282) 'except in rare and special instances' (Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44) which are ill defined, and since that Amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause, and it is uncertain that discrimination, even though
it be gross, constitutes confiscation, it is apparent that a ruling that Section 351, in
dealing unjustly and unreasonably with personal holding companies having an im-
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This is a striking injustice - an exaction without reason.
And the court, in the face of this result and of the fact that
Congress had already corrected its error in a non-retroactive
statute, tells the taxpayer, in effect, that his remedy lies with
the legislature and not with the courts!
This last approach rests on a theory of legislative suprem-
acy which is foreign to American constitutional principles of
judicial review. To the extent that it involves an incorrect
application of a statement of Justice Sutherland in Crooks v.
Harrelson,49 it is desirable to point out just what that case
did decide and what Justice Sutherland meant when he said:"0
Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of ingenuity
in the effort to find justification for wrenching from the words
of a statute a meaning which literally they did not bear in order
to, escape consequences thought to be absurd or to entail
great hardship. But an application of the principle so nearly
approaches the boundary between the exercise of the judicial
power and that of the legislative power as to call rather for
great caution and circumspection in order to avoid usurpation
of the latter .... It is not enough merely that hard and ob-
jectionable or absurd consequences, which probably were not
within the contemplation of the framers, are produced by an
act of legislation. Laws enacted with good intention, when put
to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker
himself, turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objec-
tionable. But in such case the remedy lies with the law making
authority, and not with the courts.
5 1
pairment of capital, was violative of the Fifth Amendment, could not be justified.
In his dissenting opinion in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, at page 338, Mr. Justice
Stone says: 'No tax has been held invalid under the Fifth Amendment because based
on an improper classification, and it is significant that in the entire one hundred and
forty years of its history the only taxes held condemned by the Fifth Amendment
were those deemed to be arbitrarily retroactive. See Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S.
531; Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440; Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582.'"
49 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
50 Id. at 60.
51 Justice Sutherland referred to three English cases in this connection: In re
Alma Spinning Co., 16 Ch. D. 681, 686 (1880) (involved a private company's
articles of association); The King v. Commissioners, s A. & E. 804, 816, 111 Eng.
Rep. 1370, 1376 (K.B. 1836) (involved a private act of Parliament); Abley v. Dale,
11 C.B. 378, 138 Eng. Rep. 519 (1851) (involved a term in the Insolvency Debtors
Act). These three cases involve only a rule of construction, and of course, have no
relevance to American constitutional principles.
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It would indeed be a crowning irony if this statement of
Justice Sutherland, one of the high priests of "substantive
due process," became an instrument for the destruction of
the principle of judicial review on due process grounds -
that is, for an uncritical judicial acceptance of legislation
without regard to canons even of justice and rationality. An
analysis of Crooks v. Harrelson discloses no such petard.
In that case, the Court gave effect to what it considered to
be the plain language of a federal estate tax provision which
included in the gross estate only property which was subject
to the payment of charges against the estate and the expenses
of administration and was subject to distribution as part of
the estate. Since Missouri real estate was not, as a matter of
state law, subject to the expenses of administration, it was
not included within the plain language of the statute, not-
withstanding the fact that this result might be considered to
be without any logical justification. The Court held that the
plain language of the statute controlled.
But no constitutional question was presented by the case
- merely one of statutory construction: for the due process
clause protects only persons - and not the Government -
from the consequences of governmental action. Whether the
Court should, by implication, extend the coverage of a statute
to persons plainly within its purpose but not within its
language presents a rule of construction and a different
question from that with which we are here concerned." If
An English citation that is to the point on the matter of judicial review is Bon-
ham's Case, 8 Co. 113(b), 118(a), 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610), which con-
tains Lord Coke's famous dictum: "And it appears in our books, that in many cases,
the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to
be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason,
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and
adjudge such Act to be void." Whatever may be the authority of this concept in
English constitutional law, "in his dictum in Bonham's Case [Coke] furnished a
form of words which . . . became the most important single source of the notion of
judicial review (in the United States]. Corwin, supra note 36, at 379.
52 Cf. Ayers, Where Are the Limits of the Judicial Process in Taxation? PRoc.
OF THE 41ST NAT'L TAX CONFERENCE 585 (1948) ; Miller, Federal Courts as Makers of
Income Tax Law, 6 TAX L. Rxv. 151 (1951), deploring, in different degree, "judicial
lezislation" in the field of taxation.
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the answer is that the Court should give effect to the
language, and not to the purpose, it is then fair for the
Court to remit the defeated litigant - the Government - to
its legislature for the correction of its error in phrasing the
statute.
On the other hand, where a person raises the issue that a
statute applies without any reason, a constitutional question
is presented. The court is not exercising a "legislative" func-
tion by declaring an act unconstitutional because it cannot be
rationally explained; rather, it is merely insisting, as a matter
of justice to the citizen, that the state shall not take his
property without providing him with a reason for its act. And
it is hollow advice to remit the citizen to Congress for his
remedy.
It is not proposed to elaborate further here on the subject
of judicial review otherwise than to point out that the manner
in which Section 130 became law suggests the continued
desirability of having the judiciary bring the test of reason
to bear on statutes that have been hastily, or inconsiderately,
enacted.
Section 130, for example, embodies certain factual assump-
tions as to taxpayers' motivations in spending their money.
These assumptions can be controverted from common ex-
perience.53 Yet, they were never put to the test of a public
hearing;54 and the only opportunity which the opposition had
for publicly challenging them was in the course of the Senate
debate on the bill. Let it be admitted that Senator Barkley
and others effectively stated their case; nevertheless, the
necessity for a quorum call toward the end of the debate55
53 A professional economic study would have been preferable, particularly wit
reference to the impact of the statute on bona fide businesses. For example, wha
conclusion might be drawn from the fact that more than one-fourth of the country'
business enterprises normally lose money (Greer, Cost Factors in Price-Making, 3"
HARv. Bus. REV. 33, 42 (July-Aug. 1952) if the extent and duration of the lossc
were known?
54 90 CONG. REC. 227 (1944).
55 Id. at 230.
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suggests that much of this persuasiveness may well have been
lost.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that a bill,
plausible on its face, but basically irrational, can become
law.5" Since Congress would not in good faith and after full
consideration enact unreasonable legislation, it is fair to say
that an inconsiderately-enacted bill which contains irrational
features deprives the citizen of his right to have the legis-
lature consider reasons which would persuade it from its
foolish course. The failure of the legislative process, then, is
a failure of a process of law to which the citizen is entitled.57
In these circumstances, the desirability for judicial review is
manifest.
Finally, it may be asked in the light of Section 130's char-
acter as a deduction statute, are not all deductions a matter
of legislative grace? " This dogma would give Congress
absolute authority to enact any kind of deduction statute it
wished. It is almost enough of an answer to say with Justice
Miller that "the theory of our governments, State and Na-
56 Cf. Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950), with
respect to the problem of arriving at sensible policies through the legislative process.
Cf. Emtmci, FUNDAmxENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 389 (1936):
.... we are all under the influence of the notion of the omnipotence of the state; and
this conception has undoubtedly given rise to a series of social thought sequences
which ...dominate the thinking of the whole civilized human race at this time.
Chief of these is the thought that the power to legislate is the highest power in
modern society, and that resistance to it is to be condemned under all circumstances;
that there cannot be any law within the territory of the state that is in conflict with
statute law; and that a judge who in the administration of law disregards a statute
is guilty of gross violation of duty."
57 Cf. CuaRrs, LIoNs UNDER THE THRONE 327 (1947): "The Court may well
treat a statute that is not the result of the democratic process with no more respect
and no more restraint than a Court [viz., the pre-1937 Court] which had no respect
for that process treated all statutes.
[W]here the democratic process is not working and the statute is not its result, the
Court is free to make up its own mind without the exercise of any self-restralnt."
58 E.g., New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Helvering
v. Independent Life Insurance Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). Cf. Note, An Argument
Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter
of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943), where the author, evidently
Dean Griswold, presumably accepts the dogma, as a constitutional principle, that
all deductions are a matter of grace, but deplores its use as a rule that doubtful
deduction provisions should be construed against the taxpayer.
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tional, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power any-
where." " However that may be, the line, for example,
between levying an additional tax of 10% on all Democrats,
and denying a deduction for business expenses to all Demo-
crats, is solely a question of the different impact of the two
taxing provisions among Democrats. The injustice implicit in
the "indecent discrimination" 6o of the statutes is the same.
Comparably, the decision in the Foley Securities case is no
less outrageous because the court was construing a deduction
statute. The injustice implicit in its unintentional discrimin-
ation remains.
The crux of the matter is that the issue of injustice must
always be met. And it proves nothing to point out that there
is no equal protection clause in the Fifth Amendment 6 so
long as the Supreme Court is committed to dispensing "Equal
Justice under Law." 62
59 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663 (U.S. 1874).
60 Cf. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution. 34 CoL. L. REV. 1, 32-33
(1934): "... what sense in arguing whether this is 'property,' or whether it is being
'taken,' or whether the confiscatory statute is 'due process'? Any expectation may
have value, any valuable expectation may be likened to property, or made into pro-
perty by judicial fiat, any change in law upsets some expectations, any such upset is a
deprivation, any argument on 'taking' is a quibble, and the confiscatory statute is
'due process,' if it stands. The only real question is again whether the deprivation is
indecently discriminatory: who is being penalized, and how much, for the benefit of
some one else? Can the gain achieved be regarded as at all commensurate to the
cost? Were the expectations the kind we want to see perpetuated? Does the need
press?"
61 LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921). Cf. the quota-
tion from the Foley Securities case at note 48 supra.
62 With respect to the fallacy that because deductions are a matter of legislative
grace, anything goes, cf. Tot v. United States, supra note 41 and accompanying text,
where the Government unsuccessfully sought to sustain an arbitrary statute on the
grounds that since Congress might have prohibited the possession of all firearms by
fugitives, it could establish a presumption (which might be contrary to fact) that
involved a lesser exercise of power.
See also Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 701 (1937), where Judge Chase first distinguished between two kinds of
deductions: those, such as cost-of-goods sold "inherently necessary as a matter of
computation to arrive at income" and those deductions "like personal exemptions,
deduction for taxes paid; losses sustained in unrelated transactions and other like
privileges which Congress has seen fit to accord to income taxpayers under the
dassifications it has established." He went on to say, "While the first kind of
deductions are inherently necessary as a matter of computation to arrive at income,
the second may be allowed or not in the sound discretion of Congress; the only
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Is Section 130 "Arbitrary and Unreasonable"?
Section 130, it is submitted, fits the description: The pur-
pose behind its enactment was to deny business expense
deductions in those doubtful cases where the courts had found
that certain enterprises of weathly taxpayers were not bona
fide businesses. There is, however, no implicit relationship in
reason between the extent of an operating loss and the char-
acterization - business or personal - of the enterprise
which produced it. The effect is that many taxpayers who are
not guilty of the evil that the statute seeks to correct will be
affected by it. It is this characteristic of the statute which
justifies labeling it as arbitrary.
This, of course, is not the end of the matter. It is fair to
point out that although the Holmes-Brandeis-Stone wing of
the Court never disavowed the power to declare a taxing
statute unconstitutional under the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendments, on the other hand they never gave any clear
notion of just what might constitute an unconstitutional
statute. So, if we were to assume that the view of these
justices would exert a major influence on any court which
might review Section 130, it would still be impossible to state
with certainty what the result would be on the issue of "rea-
sonableness."
One principle which has been applied in the past to justify
a statute which reaches those not within the evil with which
it treats, is that ". .. the law allows a penumbra to be em-
braced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that
the object may be secured." 63 This so-called "penumbra doc-
restriction being that it does not act arbitrarily so as to set up in effect a classifica-
tion for taxation so unreasonable as to be in violation of the Fifth Amendment."
63 Justice Holmes dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241
(1926), where the Court held unconstitutiQnal under the Fourteenth Amendment a
conclusive presumption that gifts made within six years of death were made in con-
templation of death for purpose of the Wisconsin inheritance tax. Just before the
quoted sentence, Justice Holmes said: "Of course many gifts will be hit by the tax
that were made with no contemplation of death." See Shea, The Validity of an
Inheritance Tax on Gifts Inter Vivos Within Six Years of Death, 9 MARQ. L. REV.
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trine" quite possibly contains within itself a standard of
reasonableness against which the Holmes-Brandeis-Stone
school might test statutes. If so, it seems apparent that
Section 130 is unconstitutional for the reason that, because
of their numbers and importance, there is nothing "penum-
bral" about the relationship to the statute of the taxpayers
who, although not within the purpose of the statute, are
nevertheless affected by it.
Since, however, this fact is not susceptible of proof by the
taxpayer, a court might be reluctant to substitute its estimate
of the impact of the statute for that of Congress. Then, any
decision on the constitutionality of Section 130 might well
depend upon the force that the court would give to Heiner v.
Donnan64 as a precedent. This is not necessarily so, but the
cases both contain the element that Congress, to correct an
assumed judicial misconception of its intention, passed stat-
utes which, in correcting the misconception, nevertheless
intentionally brought within their scope taxpayers who were
not guilty of the evil that the statute sought to remedy.
Defense of the majority opinion in Heiner v. Donnan in-
volves a kind of devil's advocacy, for the holding has been
almost uniformly condemned in comment on the case in the
academic legal literature.65 Nevertheless, it is submitted,
1 (1924), criticizing the statute in question before the case reached the Supreme
Court.
64 See notes 28, 30 supra, and accompanying text.
65 FRANIK FRTER, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court in LAW AND POLITiCS
54-57 (1939); GRIswoLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 574 (3d ed.
1950); Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax, 22 VA.
L. REv. 261, 265 et. seq. (1936); Notes, 2 IDAnO B.J. 214 (1932); 22 IL. BJ.
(1933); 27 ILL. L. REV. 456 (1932); 8 IND. LJ. 143 (1932); 16 MiNw. L. Rtv. 851
(1932). But see Notes, 12 B.U.L. REv. 508 (1932); 31 McH. L. Rv. 135 (1932).
Lowndes contends that Helvering v. City Bank, 296 U.S. 85 (1935), and Helvering
v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938), "have completely repudiated the reasoning upon
which [Heiner v. Donnan] rested." Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 88 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1, 33 (1939). This is disputable: both the City Bank and
Bullard cases involved classifications that were reasonably related to the purpose of
the estate tax - in the City Bank case, transfers with a reserved power to alter,
amend or revoke, either alone or in conjunction with someone else; and in the
Bullard case, transfers with a reserved life estate. Neither tax reached persons not
within the purpose of the statute.
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Justice Stone's dissent never satisfactorily dealt with the in-
justice implicit in having the tax reach the estate of 66
The young man in abounding health, bereft of life by a
stroke of lightning within two years after making a gift, [who]
is conclusively presumed to have acted under the inducement
of the thought of death, equally with the old and ailing who
already stands in the shadow of the inevitable end.
Justice Stone accepts the application of the statute to those
outside the problem with which the statute treats. He toler-
ates this because of the administrative-legislative conven-
ience of plugging the contemplation-of-death loophole 7 by
means of a statute requiring a presumption that is contrary
to fact in some of its applications. In the end, the state takes
a person's property because the legislature did not take the
trouble to express itself in terms that were limited to the
problem with which it dealt.
Granted that the Constitution gives Congress, as an inci-
dent to its taxing power, the power to remedy tax avoidance
abuses, does it (or, should it) give Congress the power to
impose a remedy where there is no abuse? It would certainly
seem not, at least if the citizen has a right to a rational
explanation for the statutes that apply to him. Moreover, if
the Constitution prohibits statutes that are "indecently dis-
criminatory," " why should it not prohibit statutes that are
irrationally discriminatory: in either case a person's property
is being taken without a sensible motive.
On the other hand, it may be suggested that legislative
convenience in writing a general statute that overreaches its
purpose is of itself enough of a reason for an overreaching
application of the statute. "Convenience," however, is no
standard at all and it represents no limitations whatsoever on
the vagaries of legislative judgment. Nevertheless, in one
66 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,327 (1932).
67 This was a judicially created loophole, and it may be that it had been sub-
stantially closed by the definitive decision in United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102
(1931), the year before Heiner v. Donnan reached the court.
68 Cf. Llewellyn, supra note 60, at 32.
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area of income tax legislation, the courts appear to have
accepted legislative convenience as a "reason" for the appli-
cation of the statute to those not within the problem with
which the statute treats, In a series of cases69 the courts have
upheld the application of the personal holding company tax
to operating companies, such as small loan businesses, not-
withstanding the fact that it was evidently the purpose of
the tax to reach "incorporated pocketbooks," and small loan
companies and the like, did not fit the description.
Of course, one can always argue in the case of "loophole
closing" statutes such as Section 130 and the personal holding
company tax, that the taxpayer who is not within its purpose
should have taken the avenue of avoidance that the statute
left open for him." The trouble with this line of reasoning is
that, on a practical level, a person who knows he is not within
-a statute's purpose should hardly be expected to look to the
details of its application. The result is that it is the hardship
cases that get into the courts - the cases where the taxpayer
was ignorant of the law or misjudged its applicability. In
these circumstances, it is unfair to turn aside from a rational
analysis of the tax qua tax on the grounds that the taxpayer
should never have allowed himself to become subject to it in
the first place.
In the last analysis, one's opinion of the decision in the
leading case on the "penumbra doctrine," Purity Extract Co.
v. Lynch,1 may tell him how he thinks this issue of justice
69 R. Simpson & Co., 44 B.T.A. 498 (1941), affd per curiam, 128 F.2d 742
(1942), dismissed, 321 U.S. 225 (1944); Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d
843 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S: 699 (1941); Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206
(1st Cir. 1939).
70 "The committee reports in both the House and the Senate, taking note of the
objection that the language of the bill might include some bona fide operating
companies which were not formed for any purpose of tax evasion, said that the bill
would work no real hardship upon any corporation except one that was being used
to reduce the surtaxes of its stockholders, because the corporation 'can always escape
this tax by distributing to its stockholders at least 90% of its adjusted net income.'"
Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1939).
71 226 U.S. 192 (1912).
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and legislative convenience should be resolved. There the
Supreme Court upheld a Mississippi prohibition statute
which prohibited the sale of all malt liquors without regard
to their alcoholic content, even when applied to a non-
alcoholic malt beverage which could not be used as a subter-
fuge for beer. The decision of the 1912 Court was unanimous;
but one commentator, who suggests that a prohibition statute
could, with as much sense, have bracketed gin and water, is
of the opinion" that "one will search the law reports in vain
to find a case containing such a perversion of logic and com-
mon sense"; and this writer, for one, agrees.
Apart from de minimis situations, why cannot the law -
tax law in particular - be framed so as to secure its object
without embracing a penumbra not related to its object? For
tax law is concerned with identifiable categories of economic
facts; and where there is disparity in the content which the
judicial and legislative branches give to these categories, the-
problem becomes one for the legislature, or the courts, to
solve by clearer expression of what the statute means. It is
not one which should be solved by catch-all provisions which
sacrifice individual justice to spare the legislature the trouble
of writing statutes which are limited in effect to those within
their object; or to spare the executive problems of proof; or
to spare the courts the effort of correctly working out Con-
gressional intent.
Finally, if we must have such catch-all statutes, then what
is probably needed to assure justice and at the same time to
avoid the assumed conflict and embarrassment involved in
declaring a statute unconstitutional, is the increased use of
the device of declaring it unconstitutional only in respect of
its application to the case before the court. 3 Theoretically,
72 Black, The "Penumbra Doctrine" in Prohibition Enforcement, 27 ILL. L. REV.
511, 512 (1933).
73 See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards,
262 U.S. 66 (1923). Cf. PROVISIONS or FEDERAL LAW HELD UNCONSTUTIONAL 115
et. seq. (Library of Congress publication 1936).
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such a practise would not change the results under a statute
such as that in issue in Heiner v. Donnan;74 theoretically,
such a statute should not be required in the first place. Prac-
tically, two presumptions - that of the statute itself and that
in favor of the constitutionality of its application - might be
more effective than one in eliminating the gap that Congress
conceives to exist between its intent and judicial notions of
its intent.
Conclusion
Section 130 is a foolish statute which should be retro-
actively repealed.
Under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court can declare unconstitutional an arbitrary statute en-
acted under the Sixteenth Amendment.
Section 130 is unconstitutionally arbitrary in that it affects
taxpayers who, in numbers and importance, stand solidly
within the statute's reach although not within its object. In
the absence of proof of these numbers and importance, the
statute is nevertheless unconstitutional in its application to
persons whose activities are not within its object. For justice
requires the courts to give a rational explanation of the appli-
cation of a statute to a particular citizen, or to declare that
application of the statute to be unconstitutional.
Justice requires the courts to draw lines - even in the half-
shadows.
John G. McQuaid*
74 See notes 28, 30, supra, and accompanying text.
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